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Abstract 
In this paper, using a unique database, we compare the performance of a set of equity 
mutual funds to a set of equity savings funds, which are similar to equity mutual funds 
in all but one characteristic: the tax regime that strongly penalizes withdrawals from 
equity savings funds. We found evidence consistent with the hypothesis that mutual 
funds less subject to liquidity shocks exhibit higher performances. 
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1. Introduction 
In the past few decades, mutual fund performance has been under the constant scrutiny 
of both academics and practitioners. There has been ample discussion on whether some 
mutual fund managers achieve a persistently higher performance that justifies the higher 
costs of actively managed funds. Several empirical studies reject the existence of 
superior performance in mutual funds (e.g. Elton et al., 1996; Fletcher and Forbes, 
2002), while many others support such a hypothesis (e.g. Grinblatt and Titmann, 1993; 
Otten and Bams, 2002). 
However, there is scarce literature on the causes of abnormal performance, and in 
particular on the effect of inflows and outflows on mutual fund returns. There is 
consensus amongst researchers that capital fund flows are sensitive to past 
performances in developed markets (Goetzmann and Peles, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 
1998; and Christoffersen, 2001), but for a small market Alves and Mendes (2011), 
instead of the convex flow-performance relationship usually documented for the US, 
found an absence of reaction to past performance. There is also evidence that back-end 
load costs are an obstacle to performance reaction (Alves and Mendes, 2007). 
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Nevertheless, there is limited research on the relationship between capital flows and 
mutual fund performance. Nanda et al. (2000) developed a model that sustains that 
mutual fund managers less subject to liquidity shocks exhibit higher performances. 
However, this theoretical prediction has not yet been found empirically.  
Working with, as far as we know, a unique dataset, which includes a set of mutual 
funds that are subject to withdrawals and another set of mutual funds that are protected 
from withdrawals, we can directly evaluate the effect of potential liquidity shocks on 
mutual fund performance. Our database includes all equity funds (EF) that invest 
mainly in Portuguese stocks and all equity savings funds (ESF). These two types of 
mutual funds are equal in all but one characteristic: the tax regime that heavily penalizes 
withdrawals from ESF. The legal framework that supports ESF was created as an 
incentive to equity investing, during the privatization “boom” in the 1990s, when many 
state-owned companies were partially or totally sold on the Portuguese stock market. 
These ESF had important tax benefits that investors could only completely take 
advantage of for holding periods of 5 to 8 years. We must note that: i) this fiscal 
advantage is directly appropriated by the investor (not by the ESF); ii) there are no 
investment restrictions either for EF or ESF, except (for both) that they must invest 
mainly in Portuguese stocks; iii) given the small size of the Portuguese stock market, 
there are no differences of style (e.g. growth versus value) between these funds; iv) EF 
and ESF are managed by the same mutual fund companies and, given the small size of 
the Portuguese mutual fund industry, inside each company (presumably) by the same 
managers. This allows us to evaluate the effect of potential withdrawals, comparing the 
performance of the two groups.  
The peculiarities of ESF can lead to different expectations regarding their 
performance when compared to equity funds. Given the nature of ESF tax benefits, 
investors will not normally withdraw money from them, since that would lead to the 
loss of those benefits. Therefore, ESF have lower liquidity needs. This means that ESF 
managers do have more resources available to invest in higher return securities than EF 
managers, which would lead us to expect better ESF performances («liquidity 
hypothesis»). However, this protection from withdrawals may have a perverse effect. In 
fact, ESF investors are discouraged to move away from poor performers given the 
strong tax disadvantage on withdrawals, and thus the fund managers will not be 
penalized for poor performances. This can induce managers to act in their own interest 
or in the interest of the company to which they belong. If this effect is dominant, we 
would expect ESF to exhibit poorer performances than EF («agency costs hypothesis»). 
 
 
2. Data and methodology 
Our sample includes a total of 30 EF – all Portuguese open-end mutual funds which 
were classified as “domestic equity funds” by APFIN1 – and 17 ESF – all “equity 
savings funds” in existence –, between 31st December 1993 and 31st December 2004, 
and is therefore identical to the population.2 The daily data for each fund is from 
DATHIS.3 All funds in existence for all or part of the period were included in the 
sample, and thus our sample is free from survivorship bias. 
                                                 
1
 APFIN is the Portuguese association of mutual fund management companies. 
2
 The special tax regime for ESF ended on 31st December 2004. Therefore, we cover the entire period 
during which this regime was in force. 
3
 Financial information disclosure service of Euronext Lisbon. 
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We use three different measures of performance: abnormal cumulative returns 
(ACR)4, risk-adjusted excess returns (alpha) using one-factor CAPM and risk-adjusted 
excess returns using Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model. The analysis is conducted on 
both sets of funds and we then compare the two sub-samples in order to determine 
whether ESF and EF have different performances.  
 
 
3. Analysis and results 
i) Analysis of Betas 
The average EF betas are lower, both in bull and bear years (see Table 1). This could be 
explained by the fact that ESF are not subject to frequent withdrawals, the managers of 
these funds not being subject to liquidity shocks. Thus, they can invest a higher 
proportion of their portfolios in stock. EF, on the other hand, need to allocate part of 
their portfolios to liquid assets, which have betas of around zero.  
 
Table 1. Average Betas 
 CAPM Model Carhart Model 
 EF ESF ESF-EF EF ESF ESF-EF 
Bull Years       
Average 0.60 0.74 0.14*** 0.59 0.74 0.14*** 
Standard Deviation 0.21 0.07 0.14*** 0.22 0.07 -0.14*** 
Bear Years       
Average 0.45 0.78 0.33*** 0.38 0.75 0.33*** 
Standard Deviation 0.23 0.04 -0.20*** 0.22 0.05 -0.20*** 
Entire Period       
Average 0.54 0.75 0.21*** 0.51 0.74 0.21*** 
Standard Deviation 0.22 0.06 -0.16*** 0.24 0.06 -0.16*** 
Obs.: (i) In this table we present the average EF and ESF betas (i.e. the market excess return coefficient) calculated using one year 
of past returns, with CAPM and Carhart Models; (ii) the market return proxy was the PSI General index (the Euronext Lisbon 
general index); (iii) Bull market years were defined as years when the value of the PSI General index at the end of the year was 
higher than its value at the beginning of the year, while bear market years were defined as years when the value of the PSI General 
index at the end of the year was lower than its value at the beginning of the year; (iv) The symbol *** shows statistical significance 
at the 0.01 level for the t-test of equal means (equal variances not assumed) and the test of homogeneity of variance (Levene 
Statistic) based on the mean.  
 
The ESF betas have lower variability, and this is confirmed by Levene’s test of 
homogeneity of variances. Thus, ESF managers seem to target betas and stick to that 
target, rather than dramatically changing the risk level of their portfolios according to 
market fluctuations. A t-test of equal sample means provides similar conclusions: 
average betas are higher for ESF than for EF (one percent significance level). 
 
ii) Analysis of Performance 
For each type of fund, we computed the average performance of portfolios constructed 
in two distinct ways. Firstly, all existing funds at the end of each quarter were assigned 
the same weight (EW). Secondly, the weight of each fund was assumed to be the weight 
of the fund’s net asset value in the total net asset value of all within the same category 
                                                 
4
 The daily abnormal return is the difference between each fund’s daily return and the market daily return 
(proxied by the PSI General index). The cumulative abnormal return is the sum of the daily abnormal 
returns. 
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(NAVW). These portfolios were rebalanced quarterly. For each of the 2 portfolios (one 
with EF, the other with ESF) and each quarter, we then computed the following yearly 
performance. The average abnormal returns achieved by these portfolios are in Table 25.  
The average annual performance of the EF portfolios is only statistically different 
from zero for the ACR equal weight case. Thus, we conclude that there is evidence that, 
on average, EF do not add value, but also do not destroy it. Given that the performance 
metrics are net of operating expenses (but gross of management fees and of subscription 
and redemption fees), we conclude that these Portuguese mutual funds create enough 
value to compensate for their operating expenses. 
As for ESF, the average performance is always positive, and it is statistically 
significant in all (but one) cases. In fact, only with ACR and the equal weight portfolios 
is performance not statistically significant. 
In order to further verify whether this difference between EF and ESF has some 
impact on investors’ money, we compare an investment made in EF to an investment 
made in ESF. For each quarter, we compute an equal weight portfolio which includes 
all the existing EF funds, and another equal weight portfolio which includes all ESF 
funds. We assume a buy-and-hold investment of one EUR in each of the portfolios from 
the date when most ESF were established (January 1996) until the end of 2004. These 
portfolios were rebalanced quarterly. Over the whole sample period, the ESF portfolios 
yield a return that is roughly 18 percent bigger (EUR 3.70 versus EUR 3.12). This 
means that the investment in equity savings funds offered higher returns than the 
investment in equity funds. 
 
Table 2. Equity funds and equity saving funds portfolio performance 
Average Performance 
Equity Funds Equity Savings Funds ESF minus EF 
EW NAVW EW NAVW EW NAVW 
ACR -1.04%** -0.18% 0.70% 0.82%* 1.74%** 1.00% 
      t-Stat -1.69 -0.26 1.05 1.36 1.92 1.09 
CAPM 1.06% 2.79% 4.86%*** 4.29%** 3.81% 1.50% 
      t-Stat 0.40 1.17 2.49 1.95 1.17 0.47 
Carhart Model 0.75% 2.70% 4.98%*** 4.07%** 4.23% 1.37% 
      t-Stat 0.28 1.11 2.59 1.82 1.29* 0.42 
Obs.: (i) In this table we present the global average annual performance of the EF and ESF portfolios; (ii) EW is the average 
performance of an equal weight portfolio of all equity funds/equity savings funds, rebalanced quarterly; (iii) NAVW is the average 
performance of a portfolio of funds with weights equal to the proportion of the fund’s net asset value on the total net asset value of 
the relevant fund category; (iv) The performance figures are annualized; (v) The t-stat reported in the «Equity Funds» and «Equity 
Saving Funds» columns refers to the null hypothesis of average performance equal to zero, and the t-stat reported in the «ESF 
Minus EF» columns refers to the null hypothesis of equal EF and ESF averages; (vi) The symbols ***, ** and * show statistical 
significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1, respectively; (vii) the alternative hypothesis is always one-sided.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
We found evidence that EF portfolios have consistently lower betas than ESF. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that EF hold more liquid assets, because they are subject 
to redemptions motivated by investor liquidity shocks.   
A comparison of the performance of the two categories of mutual funds studied 
suggests that ESF perform better than EF. These results support the liquidity hypothesis 
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 The following quarter abnormal returns were also computed, but not reported. The conclusions are 
similar. 
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and do not support the agency costs hypothesis. They also support the thesis according 
to which mutual fund managers less subject to liquidity shocks, such as the ESF 
managers, will exhibit higher performances.   
Our results also support tax policies that require longer investment horizons. 
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